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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT THE PARTIES'
PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT IS "VALID AND ENFORCEABLE"
DOES NOT ABSOLVE IT OF ITS STATUTORY AND EQUITABLE
DUTIES.
Wife's first argument on appeal is that the trial court erred as a matter of law in

consistently construing and applying the parties' Prenuptial Agreement against her and in
favor of Husband without regard to whether the ultimate result was an equitable property
division as required by Utah statutory and case law. Husband's response is that Wife
failed to show there was any "fraud, coercion or material nondisclosure" in connection
with the negotiation and execution of the Agreement, and therefore the trial court
properly determined it to be "valid and enforceable." See Appellee's Brief at 7-8.
Wife has never argued, and does not now argue, that the Prenuptial Agreement is
void ab initio. Wife does argue that in construing and applying a valid premarital
agreement to the specific facts as they have developed over the course of a long-term
marriage and as they exist at the time of enforcement, trial courts have a duty to ensure
that their property division, alimony and attorneys' fees awards are fair and equitable to
both parties. The trial court here failed to fulfill this duty. Instead, it adopted virtually all
of Husband's arguments about the construction and application of the agreement, and on
issue after issue embraced Husband's position. The result is that Wife takes nothing by
way of property division from a 16-year marriage during which both parties worked to
build a vast increase in wealth, and winds up under a mountain of debt without alimony
sufficient even to meet what the trial court itself determined to be her reasonable needs.
1
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This Court and the Utah Supreme Court have made it clear that the existence of a
marital agreement valid at the time of execution does not wholly absolve a trial court of
its overarching duty to make an equitable property division. In Pearson v. Pearson, 561
P.2d 1080 (Utah 1977), for example, citing Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5, the Utah Supreme
Court stated that "the parties cannot by contract completely defeat the authority expressly
conferred by said statute. It is the-court's prerogative to make whatever disposition of
property, including the rights in such a contract, as it deems fair, equitable, and necessary
for the protection and welfare of the parties." Id. at 1081-82 (emphasis added). The
Court emphasized that while the parties5 agreement "should be respected and given great
weight, the court is not duty bound to carry over the terms thereof." Id. at 1082. More
recently, in Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, 984 P.2d 987, cited by Husband, the Utah
Supreme Court noted the "general principle" in support of the enforcement of prenuptial
agreements absent fraud, coercion or material nondisclosure at the time of execution, but
reiterated that the parties' freedom of contract is not unlimited, and cannot "unreasonably
constrain" the trial court's "statutory and equitable duties." Id. at ^ 25.
Husband focuses solely on the terms of the Prenuptial Agreement (and, as set forth
below, so did the trial court, in a way that unjustifiably diminishes Wife's reasonable
expectations and unduly restricts her rights thereunder) without regard to whether the
result is equitable. That focus is simply inconsistent with and seeks to avoid the duty
imposed by the above precedents. Other courts that have squarely addressed the tension
inherent in applying contract principles in the specific context of a long-term marriage

2
881404 1

have rejected the extreme position, advocated by Husband and reflected in the trial
court's ruling, that a rigid and formalistic application of the strict rules of commercial
contract construction wholly trumps the trial court's duty to make a fair and equitable
property division. Instead, they recognize that, due to the unique nature of marital
agreements and divorce proceedings, those rules must be applied with some consideration
for the substantive fairness of the result reached, particularly when the agreement at issue
was negotiated and executed many years prior and intervening events would render its
strict enforcement manifestly unjust and inequitable.
For example, in McKee- Johnson v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 259 (Minn. 1989), the
Minnesota Supreme Court discussed the circumstances under which it is appropriate to
scrutinize a prenuptial agreement for substantive fairness at the time of enforcement:
Even though the public policy of the state, as reflected by the
common law, has long favored antenuptial agreements, nonetheless,
this court has always scrutinized challenged premarital agreements
purporting to allot property or limit maintenance for procedural and
substantive fairness at the inception. This scrutiny has been
prompted by a recognition of the existence of potentiality for
overreaching by one party over the other due to the relationship
existing between them at the time of the execution. We ascertain no
reason why courts should not extend a similar scrutiny to challenged
provisions of antenuptial agreements, if the premises upon which
they were originally based have so drastically changed that
enforcement would not comport with the reasonable expectations of
the parties at the inception to such an extent that to validate them at
the time of enforcement would be unconscionable.
/</. at267J

1

See also Compton v. Compton, 902 P.2d 805, 809-10 and n.4 (Alaska 1995)
(unforeseen changes in circumstances from the time the prenuptial agreement was
3
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The premises of the Minnesota court's reasoning are fully reflected in Utah law.
In Pierce v. Pierce, 2007 UT 7, 994 P.2d 193, for example, the Utah Supreme Court
reiterated that "important differences exist between marital agreements and commercial
contracts." 2007 UT 7 at % 20. The Court expressly noted:
I
Parties to premarital agreements do not deal with one another at
arm *s length. Unlike a party negotiating at arm's length, who
generally will view any proposal with a degree of skepticism, a party
to a premarital agreement is much less likely to critically examine
representations made by the other party. The mutual trust between
the parties raises an expectation that each party will act in the
other's best interest.
Id. (quoting In re Estate ofBeesley, 883 P.2d 1343, 1351 (Utah 1994)) (emphasis
i

added). These differences were certainly present at the outset of this long-term
entered can render a strict construction and application unfair and unreasonable at the
time of enforcement); McHugh v. McHugh, 181 Conn. 482, 485-86, 436 A.2d 8, 11
(1980) (requiring the trial court to examine whether "the circumstances of the parties at
the time the marriage is dissolved are not so beyond the contemplation of the parties at
the time the contract was entered into as to cause its enforcement to work injustice.")
(citing Clark, Law of Domestic Relations (1968) § 1.9; 2 Lindey, Separation Agreements
and Ante-Nuptial Contracts (Rev. Ed. 1970) § 90; 1 Nelson, Divorce and Annulment
(1945) § 13.03; 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 80; 41 Am. Jur. 2d, Husband and Wife,
§§ 283-305; annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 942)); Estate ofGillilan v. Estate ofGillilan, 406
N.E.2d 981, 988 (Ind. App. 1980) (holding that prenuptial contracts are given liberal
rather than strict construction in order to effectuate the intent of the parties); In re
Marriage ofPillard, 448 N.W.2d 714, 715, 717 (Iowa App. 1989) ("[T]he end result in
any dissolution action is not an interpretation of a prenuptial agreement but an assessment
of all factors, including the agreement, to see if there is in fact an equitable result.")
(Sackett, J., concurring); Blue v. Blue, 60 S.W.3d 585, 590 (Ky. App. 2001) ("a broader
and more appropriate test of the substantive fairness of a prenuptial agreement requires a
finding that the circumstances of the parties at the time the marriage is dissolved are not
so beyond the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was entered into as to
cause its enforcement to work an injustice."); MacFarlane v. Rich, 132 N.H. 608, 614,
567 A.2d 585, 589 (1989) (holding substantive review for unconscionability at time of
enforcement is appropriate).
4
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marriage between a never-married 25-year-old at the beginning of her career and
42-year-old twice-married established businessman.
These "important differences" require trial courts to exercise at least minimal
substantive fairness review at the time of enforcement of a marital agreement in light of
the parties' reasonable expectations at the beginning of their marriage and subsequent
developments during a long-term marriage, including the building of vast wealth through
mutual endeavor. Marriage is not, and should not be conducted as, a dispassionate
business enterprise. It involves all the vagaries of life, including choices as to lifestyle,
childbearing and childrearing, investment, sacrifice and reward, mutual commitment and
individual growth. In the dissolution of a marriage, all of these considerations should
inform a trial court's interpretation and application of the words and concepts by which
the parties set forth their general intent many years prior at the outset of their marriage.
This is not to suggest that trial courts are free to undertake an entirely subjective,
free-ranging, open-ended inquiry to an extent that would allow them to rewrite prenuptial
agreements and substitute their own judgment for the agreement of the parties. The
competing interests of freedom of contract and protection of reasonable expectations also
exist in the marital context. Thus, for example, Pearson and the other cases cited above
recognize a presumption in favor of honoring the parties' intent, and impose on the party
challenging a marital agreement the burden of demonstrating that the effect of strictly
enforcing it would be so unfair and unreasonable as to reflect a manifest injustice.

5
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But since marital agreements, unlike arms-length commercial contracts, arise in a
context of "mutual trust" and with the expectation that "each party will act in the other's
best interest," it simply cannot be said that the parties' reasonable expectations would be
defeated by the trial court's exercising a degree of scrutiny of the substantive fairness of
the result reached rather than rigidly applying the terms of a marital agreement and
professing an inability to do anything about the result, even if it is patently unfair and
inequitable. As the Minnesota court stated, trial courts must try to "strike a balance
between the law's policy favoring freedom of contract between informed consenting
adults, and substantive fairness - admittedly a difficult task." McKee-Johnson, 444
N.W.2d at 267-68. In this case, the trial court eschewed that task entirely.
Husband admits the trial court failed to engage in any consideration of substantive
i

fairness at the time of enforcement, but calls that simply a "failure to exercise discretion"
and not an abuse of discretion. (Appellee's Brief at 8-9) For the reasons discussed
I
above, the trial court's failure to exercise its statutory and equitable duties was not a mere
"failure to exercise discretion," but legal error arising from its disregard of relevant
precedents. But even under an abuse of discretion standard, while trial courts have
"considerable latitude of discretion in the disposition of property," the appellate courts
must ensure that a property division does not work "such a manifest injustice or inequity
as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion." Pearson, 561 P.2d at 1082. Thus, regardless
of whether this Court examines the trial court's actions for correctness or an abuse of
i

I

i

i

discretion, the threshold question remains the same: is the substantive result achieved
6
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through the trial court's interpretation and application of the Prenuptial Agreement to the
facts in this case consistent with the overarching duty of trial courts in divorce cases to
reach resolution that is fair and equitable to both parties?
As set forth in the cases discussed above, answering that question requires an
understanding of both parties' reasonable expectations. In this case, the trial court
focused solely on Husband's expectations, finding it "hard to believe," for example, that
Husband could have expected that the term "earnings" as used in the Prenuptial
Agreement would include anything other than "salary, guaranteed payments to a member
in a limited liability company, or draws to a partner in an operating business
partnership."2 As set forth more fully below, that strict interpretation is not driven by
either the plain language or the overall structure and intent of the Agreement. And it is
wholly unjustified in light of Wife's reasonable expectations at the time of the marriage
and subsequent developments.
As the trial court noted, at the time Wife signed the Prenuptial Agreement,
Husband was earning $2 million a year, the parties were living a life of luxury in
Southern California, and Wife was pursuing a modeling and acting career. By entering
the Prenuptial Agreement, she agreed generally to waive her rights to marital property,
2

See R. 2296-97, «f 42: "The Court finds it hard to believe that [Husband] went to the
trouble of obtaining such a comprehensive and detailed prenuptial agreement so that he
could ensure that [Wife] could claim one-half of the profits from any business venture in
which he would become involved." The trial court purported to ground its speculation in
this regard in the language and structure of the Agreement, but neither the language nor
the structure dictates what the trial court concluded to be Husband's intention, and one is
left with the suspicion that the trial court's "reasoning" was tendentious.

881404 1

7

but she also carved out two specific areas where Husband's "earnings" would constitute
I
marital property. Although the Agreement did not require Husband to pursue any
I
vocation, it certainly anticipated that, to the extent he did, there would be something to
divide, even if the marriage were to dissolve after only a short duration.
Thereafter, Wife uprooted herself and moved from Southern California to Deer
I
Valley to accommodate Husband's desire for a lifestyle change. She abandoned her
career and helped Husband create and pursue a luxurious lifestyle of horses,
houseboating, entertaining, travel, skiing and resort living. She then uprooted herself
i

i

again, with a substantial diminution in lifestyle, to help turn a run-down cattle ranch into
the world-class Sorrell River Ranch resort. She then devoted herself to caring for and
rearing the parties' daughter so that Husband could work more than 100 hours a week on
i

i

Ranch and other business. She worked long hours herself without pay or benefits, acting
as proprietor and hostess to welcome guests and make them feel at home for their stay at
the resort. Husband also regularly touted her as a "co-owner" and used her image in
I
promotional materials. Wife joyfully did all of these things with the expectation and
understanding that she was helping to build a secure financial future for Husband and
herself.
Is it not equally "hard to believe" that, after all this, Wife would reasonably expect
the Agreement would be interpreted and applied to endorse Husband's management of
his post-marital affairs in such a way as to ensure that he would not have any "earnings,"
and thereby deprive her of any marital interest, when the matter is totally within his
8
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control? The trial court's negative answer questions means that Wife must reasonably
have expected that after she gave her all to the marriage, and as a result contributed to a
vast increase in wealth, she could not reasonable expect to have any share as marital
property. Neither the language nor the structure of the Agreement supports such a
draconian conclusion. Instead, as set forth more fully below in Section II of this
Argument, an entirely proper, and eminently more fair and reasonable, interpretation of
the Prenuptial Agreement would have resulted in a marital interest in at least some part of
the more than $20 million in wealth Wife helped create during the marriage.
Not only was the trial court utterly unconcerned with overarching equitable
considerations and how any final resolution of this matter might reflect Wife's reasonable
expectations under the Prenuptial Agreement, it appears from an overall assessment of
the trial court's approach that at every turn, when confronted with a decision about how
to interpret and apply the Prenuptial Agreement to the specific facts in this case, the trial
court adopted Husband's position and rejected Wife's position. In at least one instance,
the trial court did so because "it would not have been fair" to Husband. (R. 2517-18)
Thus the trial court was not wholly unconcerned with "fairness"; it was selectively
concerned with ensuring a result that was fair - to Husband. That approach is
inconsistent with the trial court's legal obligation to ensure the result it reaches is
substantively fair and equitable to both parties. It also reflects such bias and misprision
that this Court can only be left with the definite impression of an abuse of discretion.

9
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II.

THE FACT THAT HUSBAND DID NOT "TAKE" OR "RECEIVE"
ANY SALARY FROM SORRELL RIVER RANCH OR FLAT IRON
MESA DOES NOT MEAN THERE WERE NO MARITAL
PROPERTY "EARNINGS" FROM THOSE ACTIVITIES UNDER
THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT.
In her opening brief, Wife showed that the first major area where the trial court's

overly rigid and formalistic approach created error was with respect to the term
"earnings" in the Prenuptial Agreement Wife showed that the Agreement expressly
created two different scenarios where post-marital "earnings" become marital property:
(1) "earnings," defined as "compensation from labor or services performed by" Husband,
"derived from" or traceable to "actual employment or effort" (Tr. Ex. 6, at p. 6, ^ F.2);
and (2) "earnings or salary" from a "business venture" entered into "from and after the
date of marriage .. . regardless of whether such earnings or salary have been derived
from actual effort or services performed by [Husband] for or on behalf of the business
venture." {Id. at p. 10, \ F.3)
Husband does not address Wife's argument directly, but instead creates a straw
man, arguing that Wife's proposed construction and application of the term "earnings"
under these provisions would encompass "any increase in [Husband's] separate
property." (Appellee's Brief, at 14) That is simply untrue; Husband enjoyed a vast
increase in his net worth, from $10 million at the time of the marriage to at least $33
million at the time of trial; Wife never suggested she was entitled to half of that increase.
Moreover, Wife's interpretation is rooted both in the language of the agreement (the use
of the term "earnings or salary" indicates they are not the same thing) and in the fact that,

10
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in the specific context of divorce, California courts have refused to equate of "earnings"
with "salary," and have expressly ruled that the term "earnings" is "broader in scope than
'wages' and 'salary.'" In re Marriage oflmperato, 45 Cal. App. 3d 432, 437, 199 Cal.
Rptr. 590, 593 (Cal. App. 1975).
Husband also insists, and the trial court agreed, that "[t]he only tenable reading" of
these provisions is "that all earnings or salary taken by [Husband] are to be treated as
earnings even if his labor and efforts did not directly result in the earnings that were
taken"' (Appellee's Brief, at 16 (emphasis added); see also R. 2297, finding that because
Husband "did not receive any salary or earnings from the Resort or Flat Iron Mesa as
contemplated by the Agreement," no marital property interest exists under either
provision (emphasis added)) The definition of "earnings" in the Agreement does not
require that post-marital "earnings" be paid out, taken or received to become marital
property; it simply requires that they be "derived from" or traceable to Husband's efforts
or business ventures. But even such a narrow reading, there is no dispute that Husband
actually did "take" and "receive" income from Flat Iron Mesa during the marriage,
reporting $1,056,080 before 2005, and a total of $1.5 million by the time of trial. (Tr.
Ex. 8, at 9, 12)
Wife respectfully submits that only the most crimped and one-sided construction
and application of the Prenuptial Agreement to what did happen in this case - a reading
virtually calculated to deprive Wife of the benefit of her bargain set forth in the very
limited exceptions creating marital property under the Agreement - would result in the

11
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conclusion that Husband "earned" nothing from either Sorrell River Ranch or Flat Iron
Mesa that could be considered marital property under the Agreement.3 Such a reading is
particularly improper in a case such as this where Husband managed the finances of those
endeavors, had complete discretion and control of whether or not he "took" or "received"
any "salary," and thus was able to intentionally avoid creating "marital property" by
I
paying directly many personal living expenses through the business and essentially
deferring income by not taking out until after the parties had separated and the divorce
was final all the profits that were his for the taking all along.
The language and intent of the Agreement, construed with an eye toward justice
and equity and without prejudice in favor of Husband or against Wife, plainly supports a
broader interpretation than Husband advocated and the trial court embraced. Indeed, the
trial court itself recognized as much, stating it "expects that an appeal of this decision is
likely" and proceeding to analyze "earnings" under a broader definition. (See R. 2244)
In doing so, however, the trial court continued to err, ruling that (a) any possibility of
"earnings" terminated at the time of separation, even though the Prenuptial Agreement
3

Even the case cited by Husband, Prachasaisoradej v. Ralphs Grocery Co., Inc., 42 Cal.
4th 217, 165 P.3d 133 (Cal. 2007), which involves interpretation of the terms "earnings"
in the contexts of California's workers' compensation statutes and is therefore irrelevant
here, does not support a construction that would require any "earnings" to actually be
"taken" or "received." On the contrary, it includes within "earnings" any amount "the
employer has offered or promised to pay, or has paid pursuant to such an offer or
promise, as compensation for that employee's labor," and that amount can include
"profit," "i.e., a specified and promised share of the revenues attributable to that
employee's personal sales or managerial efforts." Id. at 138, 143. That is essentially the
same approach Wife urged on the trial court, and Husband now mischaracterizes as
"extremely broad."
12
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defines "earnings" more broadely (see Argument Section III below and Appellant's Brief
at Argument Section H.A.); and (b) Flat Iron Mesa was not a "business venture," even
though Husband chose to incorporate it as such, handled the books and records through
the Ranch and his own long-time accounting firm, and otherwise fully satisfied any
reasonable definition of that term (see Appellant's Brief at Argument Section H.B.).
In order immediately to remedy the trial court's obvious errors with respect to its
unjustifiably narrow definition of "earnings," Wife respectfully requests that she be
awarded, at a minimum, a one-half share of the $1,056,080 in income Husband received
pre-separation from Flat Iron Mesa and reported as income from what he described as his
occupation ("Real Estate Developer") on his tax returns. Wife also requests that this case
be remanded to the trial court for proper consideration of whether additional "earnings"
should essentially be imputed to Husband and considered as part of an equitable property
division, including but not limited to the additional $500,000 or so Husband received
from Flat Iron Mesa after the parties' separation; the $1.6 million in net cash flow from
the Ranch during the marriage; and additional profits taken by Husband upon the sale of
the Ranch. The fact that he chose not to "take" or "receive" these funds as "salary" in an
apparent effort to deprive Wife of her reasonable expectations and the benefit of the
bargain she made in the Prenuptial Agreement does not justify excluding them from the
marital estate.

13
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III.

HUSBAND'S POST-TRIAL EARNINGS ARE NOT ONLY
RELEVANT BUT MUST BE CONSIDERED IN THIS CASE, AND
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CUTTING
OFF DISCOVERY AND EVIDENCE OF "EARNINGS" AS OF THE
DATE OF SEPARATION.
Wife's third argument challenges the trial court's ruling that Husband's post-

separation earnings are irrelevant. Husband incorrectly asserts Wife failed to identify the
ruling appealed from, failed to describe why it was error, and failed to show it was an
abuse of the trial court's discretion in governing discovery and other pretrial processes.
(See Appellee's Brief, at 16-20)
To reiterate, the ruling Wife challenges is the trial court's ruling upholding
Husband's unilateral decision to cut off discovery as of December 31, 2005. The trial
court did so in denying Wife's Motion to Compel as well as in denying her subsequent
Rule 54(b) Motion. (R. 1308-44, 1635-36) Those rulings are erroneous for two reasons:
(1) they were based entirely on Section 771 of the California Family Code, which does
not apply given the express language of the Prenuptial Agreement to the contrary; and
1
(2) they are contrary to Utah law requiring that Husband's post-separation earnings be
considered in the unique circumstances of this case in determining property division
and/or alimony.
As to the first reason, there is no dispute that Section 771 generally provides that
"earnings and accumulations of a spouse . .. while living separate and apart from the
other spouse, are the separate property of the spouse." Cal. Fam. Code § 771(a). But the
parties' Prenuptial Agreement expressly provides otherwise: "'earnings' or 'base salary,'
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or accumulations from such earnings or salary, derived from actual effort or employment
of [Husband], from and after the date of the marriage, shall be community property."
(Tr. Ex. 6 at p. 9, % F.2) (emphasis added). This language plainly encompasses
"earnings" derived at any point "from and after the date of the marriage," even if the
parties were married but not living together, i.e., if they were separated before the divorce
was final. The parties' express agreement that the marital estate includes all earnings
"from and after the date of the marriage" is controlling, and the trial court erred in cutting
off discovery and proof of post-separation earnings based on Section 771.
Even if the Agreement did not expressly supplant Section 771, however, Wife
would still be entitled to inquire into Husband's post-separation earnings under
applicable Utah statutes. Husband's contrary arguments miss the mark. First, Husband
argues that Wife did not preserve this issue below {see Appellee's Brief, at 20), but that is
simply incorrect - Wife set forth this very argument in her Rule 54(b) Motion. (R. 158797) Second, Husband argues that any inquiry into his post-separation earnings would be
irrelevant because he stipulated that he could pay any amount of alimony the trial court
might award. {See Appellee's Brief, at 20-21) Wife's argument, however, goes not to
Husband's ability to pay, but to the statutory requirement under Utah law that the trial
court must consider whether this "marriage of long duration" dissolved "on the threshold
of a major change m the income of one spouse due to the collective efforts of both."
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(e). The trial court could not properly fulfill its statutory
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responsibility in this regard without even allowing Wife to discover, let alone present,
evidence of such a change.
Although she was not allowed discovery of the issue, Wife did elicit at trial that
Husband was in negotiations to sell the Ranch. (R. 2558 at 475) All of the evidence
suggests that, after Husband's investing some $12 million and Wife's investing years of
"sweat equity," as of the time of the divorce Husband stood "on the threshold of a major
change" in the form of profits from the sale of the Ranch due to the value added to the
formerly desolate property from "the collective efforts of both." Information about that
was not only relevant, the trial court was required to consider it. The trial court's ruling
I
precluding Wife from even gathering evidence to demonstrate and quantify that change,
evidence that indisputably falls within the scope of Rule 26, was therefore erroneous as a
matter of Utah law as well as contrary to the plain language of the Prenuptial Agreement.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
EXPRESSLY AWARDING WIFE ALIMONY IN AN AMOUNT LESS
THAN HER ESTABLISHED NEED.
Wife showed that, in the determination of alimony, both the Prenuptial Agreement

and applicable Utah law justify special consideration of the unique factual circumstances
here. The trial court showed no concern, let alone the "particular concern" counseled in
Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987), as to "whether [Wife] has made any
contribution toward the growth of the separate assets for [Husband] and whether the
assets were accumulated or enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties." Wife therefore
challenges the trial court's conclusion - awarding Wife basically what Husband said she
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needed as evidenced by her post-separation lifestyle, which was much less than the "Deer
Valley" lifestyle she abandoned to help build the Ranch, and which was even less than
the amount the trial court itself determined to be her reasonable need - as inconsistent
with law.4
The trial court recognized and acknowledged that the marital lifestyle was
characterized by a situation few people can dream of: an "amenities lifestyle" with all
the accoutrements and services of a world-class luxury resort available for use at any
time, and a virtually unlimited budget with the ability "to purchase anything [Wife]
desired to purchase." (See R. 2231-32) The court also acknowledged that the parties
spent $9,000 a month pre-separation just on Wife's personal expenses - which obviously
did not include housing expenses, food expenses, horse expenses and many expenses for
personal care, recreation, housekeeping and other services that were provided by the
Ranch. (Id. at 2247) The court even acknowledged that, in addition to the many
amenities of the resort, Wife had "access to [Husband's] substantial monetary reserves."
(Id. at 2249)
Rather than even attempt to quantify that lifestyle, however - which is exactly
what Wife's expert did - the trial court inexplicably concluded that it could not possibly
replace those lifestyle attributes with alimony, and instead set about arbitrarily to slash
4

Husband argues throughout his brief that Wife has failed to "marshal the evidence."
Husband correctly notes, however, that Wife generally does not challenge the trial court's
factual findings, but its legal errors. Where the focus of the challenge is on legal error,
the marshaling requirement does not apply. See Anderson v. Thompson, Not Reported in
P.3d, 2008 WL 2058253 (Utah App. 2008).
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the budget Wife's expert proposed to the extent it exceeded Wife's actual, postseparation expenditures. {Id. at 2249-50) As a result, the trial court once again reached
essentially the conclusion Husband advocated, awarding Wife $12,000 a month net
($15,000 a month gross) where Husband had proposed $10,000 a month and Wife had
sought $30,000 a month. {Id. at 2251)
The trial court then compounded its error. After establishing that Wife required
$12,000 per month in net alimony to satisfy her needs, it determined that she should pay
$30,000 of her own fees, plus all fees she incurred after June 30, 2007. {See R. 2371,
^1 77) It did so without any consideration of the fact that requiring her to pay her
i

attorneys' fees would add to her need for alimony, and without making any compensating
adjustment to cover that need. As set forth in Wife's opening brief, requiring her to pay
attorneys' fees without factoring in the impact on her ability to pay (beyond the $30,000
from her retirement savings) was legal error.
The trial court then further compounded its error in an even more egregious and
blatant fashion by requiring Wife to pay Husband's attorneys' fees. It did so not only
without including the required payments (initially $5,000 a month, later reduced to
$2,500 a month)5 in Wife's needs, but with an express recognition that doing so would
5

The trial court's original ruling requiring a deduction of a whopping $5,000 per month,
or nearly 50% of the amount the trial court determined necessary to meet Wife's need of
$12,000 a month net, was adjusted to $2,500 per month only upon Wife's showing that,
assuming she had to pay Robert $5,000 a month and her own counsel $5,000 a month to
retire her attorneys' fees obligations, she would be left with $3,000 a month - only onequarter of what the trial court itself determined to be her need. While requiring Hope to
pay at least $2,500 a month for Husband's fees, the trial court speculated, without any
18
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reduce the amount she received below what is necessary to meet her post-separation
needs - which as Wife has demonstrated was already far below the luxurious lifestyle she
had enjoyed during the marriage and sacrificed to help build the Ranch.
Specifically, the trial court found that because Husband was the prevailing party
under the attorney fees provision of the Prenuptial Agreement, "the court must award
[Husband] his fees incurred in connection with the dispute over the application of the
[prenuptial] Agreement" (R. 2372, ^ 82), and that Husband was "entitled to recover these
fees from [Wife] by deducting $5,000 [later reduced to $2,500] from each month's
alimony payment." (Id., f 84) The court then candidly stated that it "recognizes that
allowing [Husband] to deduct $5,000 per month from awarded alimony of $15,000 will
mean that [Wife] will not receive enough money to maintain her at the standard of living
she enjoyed during the marriage. [Wife] will naturally have to curtail her living
standard but will still be able to maintain a comfortable lifestyle." (R. 2372-73, % 85)
(emphasis added).
Given the legal requirement that alimony be sufficient to maintain the preseparation marital lifestyle, the trial court's explicit acknowledgment that it was awarding
Wife less than that amount, even after all the deductions it had made to Wife's proposed
budget, and suggesting she "curtail her living standard" and adjust to a "comfortable
lifestyle" instead, reflects an abject failure to apply the factors as required by case law
evidence, that she would not have to pay so much to her own attorneys, and therefore still
declined to consider increasing Wife's need to include her own attorneys' fees. [Cite to
ruling]
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and statutes. Such a "failure to consider the[] factors constitutes an abuse of discretion."
Batty v. Batty, 2006 UT App. 506,1 4, 153 P.3d 827.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT'S RULINGS ON ATTORNEYS' FEES
REFLECT THE SAME RIGID (AND BIASED) MINDSET THAT
RESULTED GENERALLY IN AN UNFAIR AND INEQUITABLE
CONSTRUCTION AND APPLICATION OF THE PRENUPTIAL
AGREEMENT.
Finally, Wife challenged the trial court's rulings on attorneys' fees as a matter of

law. As the trial court noted, under consideration were Wife's attorney's fees as well as
Husband's. The trial court required Wife to pay her own attorney's fees using her
meager retirement account "along with her income, if needed, to cover at a minimum
$30,000 of her own fees plus whatever amount her fees since June 30, 2007, exceed
$30,000." (R. 2371, U 77) The trial court recognized that even requiring Wife to pay
$2,500 a month on Husband's fees would reduce her income below what it found to be
her need, and was wholly unconcerned with the additional extent to which requiring her
to pay "whatever amount" of her own fees she incurred after June 30, 2007 (the most feeintense period in the case, involving trial preparation and trial) would even further render
her unable to meet her needs. Husband does not address the fact that the trial court
expressly found its attorneys' fees rulings would violate the standards for awarding
alimony, and that is plain legal error by the trial courtJ
The trial court's requiring Wife to pay her own fees was also improper and
unlawful punishment for her having sought to establish her rights to marital property
under the Prenuptial Agreement. After acknowledging that Wife would not have enough
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to maintain the marital lifestyle, the trial court stated that was simply a consequence of
Wife's "decision to pursue a claim for community property when the clear intent of the
Agreement she signed before marrying was to sharply limit the creation of community
property." (R. 2372-73, ^ 85) In other words, although on its face the Prenuptial
Agreement recognized two specific instances in which Husband's post-marital "earnings"
would become marital property, and although Wife advanced legitimate arguments that
such "earnings" flowed both from his post-marital efforts with the Ranch and his Flat
Iron Mesa business venture, because the trial court did not ultimately accept those
arguments it was justified in punishing Wife for even making them.
The trial court's punitive approach is ungrounded in any statute or rule authorizing
sanctions, and is contrary to public policy. It would require a party to decide at the outset
of a case either to acquiesce in the other party's interpretation of a premarital agreement
or risk being on the hook for her own fees as well as those of the other party, even if she
has advanced reasonable contrary interpretations (as the trial court here found). That risk
would have such a chilling effect as to effectively preclude a party from presenting her
case, contrary to the public policy set forth in the attorneys' fees statute.
Husband argues that the trial court's advancing Wife $120,000 in fees through
June 30, 2007 allowed Wife to present her case, and that the trial court warned Wife that
she might be obligated for attorneys' fees from her alimony award or property division.
{See Appellee's Brief, at 27, 31, 34) Wife understood and accepted this warning to
suggest she would be held responsible if she were to drag things out or present frivolous
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arguments, and indeed requiring a party to pay her own fees under such circumstances
essentially as a sanction might be appropriate in certain cases. But Wife also reasonably
understood and expected that if the trial court required her to pay attorneys' fees it would
give her the means to do so - otherwise it would not be meeting its legal obligation to
ensure that she could maintain the marital lifestyle.
With specific reference to the trial court's applying the Prenuptial Agreement to
require Wife to pay Husband's fees, Husband's position, and the trial court's ruling,
simply avoids an inevitable conflict in principles where a marital agreement appears to
dictate a result that would work a substantial injustice in a particular case contrary to
statutory elements and case law precedents. Other courts have addressed that conflict
head on, and in so doing have recognized that resort to the "certainty" of over-reliance on
I
the parties' intent expressed many years prior should not trump consideration of the
standard statutory criteria and case law precedents for awarding attorneys' fees.6 The
trail court here simply avoided the conflict and punted to this Court.
6

See Kessler v. Kessler, 33 A.D.3d 42, 45, 47-48, 818 N.Y.S.2d 571 (N.Y. App. Div.
2006) ("The enforceability of a provision of a prenuptial agreement waiving the right to
seek an award of an attorney's fee presents a clash of two competing public policies-that
in favor of resolving marital issues by agreement and that in favor of assuring that
matrimonial matters are determined by parties operating on a level playing field.... The
determination as to whether or not a provision waiving the right to seek an award of an
attorney's fee is enforceable must be made on a case-by-case basis after weighing the
competing public policy interests in light of all relevant facts and circumstances both at
the time the agreement was entered and at the time it is to be enforced. If, upon such an
inquiry, the court determines that enforcement of the provision would preclude the nonmonied spouse from carrying on or defending a matrimonial action or proceeding as
justice requires, the provision may be held unenforceable.") See also Mulhern v.
Mulhern, 446 So. 2d 1124, 1125 (Fla. App. 1984) ("[T]he trial court should have
22
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CONCLUSION
Wife wishes to bring to the Court's attention one final development that she
believes reflects the trial court's continuing animosity and refusal to consider the
substantial inequities in its rulings. Last fall, after Wife completed her individual tax
returns, she filed a motion with the trial court seeking a modest adjustment in her gross
alimony award to reflect her actual combined effective tax rate rather than the 20% tax
rate the trial court assumed. The trial court failed to rule on that motion for several
months. Finally, after repeated inquiries from Wife's counsel as to the status of the
ruling, the trial court issued a one-sentence order denying Wife's motion without
explanation.
Wife has sought to avoid drawing inferences as what might explain the trial
court's obvious propensity to consistently adopt Husband's positions and reject hers.
Wife has demurred even when the trial court has unfairly castigated Wife in personal
terms.7 This latest ruling, however, leaves Wife with the distinctly disturbing sense that

adjudicated the issue, without bar of the agreement, considering all the usual pertinent
criteria such as the respective financial circumstances of the parties, that is to say, the
need of the wife and the ability of the husband to pay. It is basic that the purpose of
awarding attorney fees is to place the spouses on a financial parity for the prosecution or
defense of the dissolution action.").
7 The most egregious example is the trial court's accusing Wife of "attacking
[Husband's] character in her filings in support of her Motion for Temporary Orders. {See
R. 2518) The fact of the matter is that Wife's initial motion papers did not include any
such attacks, but Husband responded with savage attacks in his own Affidavit and those
of his girlfriend and others falsely accusing Wife of all kinds of misdeeds that were
totally irrelevant to the financial issues Wife raised. Wife was then forced to defend
23
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the trial court in this case is fundamentally incapable of or unwilling to follow an
unbiased, reasoned, fair approach on any issue she raises. Accordingly, Wife respectfully
requests that this Court grant her affirmative relief as dictated by the record, and remand
this case to the trial court with specific instructions so that she can have confidence that
justice and equity will be done.
Specifically, Wife respectfully requests that this Court grant her the following
relief:
•

An immediate property division award of $528,040, representing one half
of Husband's pre-separation earnings from Flat Iron Mesa, pursuant to
Paragraph F.3. of the Prenuptial Agreement;

•

An additional property division award of $800,000, representing one half of
1
the $1.6 million pre-separation net cash flow from the Sorrell River Ranch;

0

Instructions to the trial court to construe the term "earnings" in the
Prenuptial Agreement as extending to post-separation gains by Husband
from both Flat Iron Mesa and the Sorrell River Ranch and to award Wife an
equitable share thereof;

•

Immediate relief from the obligation to pay Husband's attorneys' fees so
that she receives the $15,000 a month gross alimony the trial court itself
determined to represent her need;

herself. Rather than view that skirmish in the proper light, the trial court blamed it on
Wife and cited it as further justification for its punitive attorneys' fees ruling.
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•

Instructions to the trial court to ascertain the total amount of Wife's
attorney's fees incurred from and after June 30, 2007, including for this
appeal, and to make an attorney's fees award consistent with the statutory
requirements in light of the reasonableness of the fees incurred and the
parties' respective ability to pay.

DATED this y

day of April, 2009.
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